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BIANNUAL SURVEY

CPLR 3211(a)(7), for failure to state a cause of action, and
asked that his motion be treated as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c).209
After reviewing all of the
papers before it, the court declined to exercise its power to so
treat the motion, on the simple ground that the papers were not
sufficiently complete to enable it to determine as a matter of law
that the plaintiff had no cause of action.
It is only when, upon a CPLR 3211 motion, the entirety of
papers before the court is so thorough and complete that the
court can determine from them that no substantial issue of fact
is involved that the court can treat a motion to dismiss as one
for summary judgment and dispose of it as if it were a motion
originally made under 3212.210 Where the papers before the
court are insufficient to justify a motion for summary judgment
under 3212, they are, ipso facto, insufficient to allow an exercise
of the treat-as-summary-judgment power of 3211(c) .211
CPLR 3212(a): Motion for summary judgment where
third-party defendant not joined in the action.
In Koreska v. United Cargo Corp.,212 plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment was granted before the answering time of the
third-party defendant had expired. The appellate division held
that lack of notice of the motion presented no procedural bar to
the granting of such motion.
It is true, of course, that whether or not the third-party
defendant is to have any liability at all depends upon whether
the plaintiff recovers anything from the defendant (third-party
plaintiff). Thus, any matter that would affect plaintiff's claim
would be of vital importance to the third-party defendant. It is
this interest which CPLR 1008 recognizes in permitting the thirdparty defendant to submit whatever the defendant could have interposed to defeat the plaintiff.2 1 3 The same consideration would
seem due the third-party defendant when a summary judgment
motion is made by the plaintiff.
20 CPLR 3211(c) allows the court to treat a 3211(a) or (b) motion
as a motion for summary judgment.
2104 WEINSTEIN,
KORN & MMILE, op. cit. supra note 196, fr 3212.02.
211 Cf. Cohen v. Dannia, 7 App. Div. 2d 886, 181 N.Y.S.2d
220 (4th
Dep't 1959); Di Sabato v. Soffes, 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184
(lst Dep't 1959).
21223 App. Div. 2d 37, 258 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1965); cf. American
Surety Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 3 Misc. 2d 363, 367-68, 154 N.Y.S.2d
260, 263-64 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd mer., 3 App. Div. 2d 831, 162 N.Y.S.2d
334 (1st Dep't 1957).
213 Mansfield Iron Works, Inc. v. Silveri, 106 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct.
1951) ; see Bobrose Dev., Inc. v. Jacobson, 251 App. Div. 825, 296 N.Y. Supp.
520 (2d Dep't 1937).
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The court in Koreska (though the opinion in this regard
is far from exhaustive) apparently balanced the above considerations and concluded that the position of the third-party defendant
on the facts should not be permitted to prevent the summary
judgment motion of the plaintiff. It is clear, however, that even
if all those factors in favor of the third-party defendant's claim
were passed upon by the court, the result might well have been
the same, for the court has the power to dismiss a thirdparty claim even on the simple ground that its mere presence
2 14
would unduly delay or prejudice the main claim.

CPLR 3212(g):

Effective means of striking denials.

In Cicci v. Lincoln Natl Bank, 21 5 although plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment was denied, the court granted his request
to strike certain denials of the defendant pursuant to CPLR
3212(g).
The Survey reports this case only for a suggestion implicit
within it which may serve a purpose akin to that served by the
prior law motion to strike denials. If a summary judgment
motion is denied or granted only in part, the court is empowered
under 3212(g) to incorporate into its order whatever facts it
deems uncontroverted (from a perusal of the summary judgment
motion papers), to the end that those facts will be deemed es21 6
tablished for all further purposes of the litigation.
Thus if a plaintiff feels that only certain denials in the answer
are without merit, he need not be without remedy because he no
longer has available the motion to strike denials. 21 7 He may move
for summary judgment, perhaps even with the knowledge that he
cannot prevail, with the aim of having the court, in its order
denying the motion, list as established those denied facts
which, on the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff can show
to be without merit.
Therefore, although a motion to strike denials does not
exist per se under the CPLR, the attorney is advised that the
same effect may be achieved by the utilization of CPLR 3212(g)
upon denial of a motion for summary judgment 2 18

214

CPLR 1010.

21546 Misc. 2d 465, 260 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Syracuse City Ct. 1965).
2
26Comnpare 4 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MiLER, NEW YopK CMvxr- PRACTIcE
13212.11 (1964), Wvith 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACnicE T5620 (1964).
217 Chicago Dressed Beef Co. v. Gold Medal Packing Corp., 22 App. Div.
2d 1010, 254 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dep't 1964); 3 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MiLLER,
op. cit. supra note 216, 1 3024.10.
2184 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLaz, op. cit. supra note 216, f13212.12.

